{"id":4922,"date":"2026-07-24T11:02:31","date_gmt":"2026-07-24T11:02:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/interenef.com\/?p=4922"},"modified":"2026-07-24T11:08:53","modified_gmt":"2026-07-24T11:08:53","slug":"energetska-suverenost-hrvatske-iz-ekonomske-perspektive","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/interenef.com\/en\/2026\/07\/24\/energetska-suverenost-hrvatske-iz-ekonomske-perspektive\/","title":{"rendered":"Energetska suverenost hrvatske iz ekonomske perspektive"},"content":{"rendered":"<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-post\" data-elementor-id=\"4922\" class=\"elementor elementor-4922\" data-elementor-post-type=\"post\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-172ba6e3 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"172ba6e3\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-41726831\" data-id=\"41726831\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-1d626b61 elementor-tabs-view-horizontal elementor-widget elementor-widget-tabs\" data-id=\"1d626b61\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"tabs.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-tabs\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-tabs-wrapper\" role=\"tablist\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div id=\"elementor-tab-title-4921\" class=\"elementor-tab-title elementor-tab-desktop-title\" aria-selected=\"true\" data-tab=\"1\" role=\"tab\" tabindex=\"0\" aria-controls=\"elementor-tab-content-4921\" aria-expanded=\"false\">Hrvatski<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div id=\"elementor-tab-title-4922\" class=\"elementor-tab-title elementor-tab-desktop-title\" aria-selected=\"false\" data-tab=\"2\" role=\"tab\" tabindex=\"-1\" aria-controls=\"elementor-tab-content-4922\" aria-expanded=\"false\">English<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-tabs-content-wrapper\" role=\"tablist\" aria-orientation=\"vertical\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-tab-title elementor-tab-mobile-title\" aria-selected=\"true\" data-tab=\"1\" role=\"tab\" tabindex=\"0\" aria-controls=\"elementor-tab-content-4921\" aria-expanded=\"false\">Hrvatski<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<div id=\"elementor-tab-content-4921\" class=\"elementor-tab-content elementor-clearfix\" data-tab=\"1\" role=\"tabpanel\" aria-labelledby=\"elementor-tab-title-4921\" tabindex=\"0\" hidden=\"false\"><p>Diplomat, dr.sc.Karino Hromin Sturm , Zagreb<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>1.Izme\u0111u prirodnih resursa, uvozne ovisnosti i strate\u0161kih odluka<\/strong><\/p><p>Energetska suverenost danas predstavlja jedan od klju\u010dnih stupova gospodarske sigurnosti svake dr\u017eave. Iako Hrvatska raspola\u017ee vlastitim zalihama nafte i prirodnog plina te zna\u010dajnim potencijalom za proizvodnju elektri\u010dne energije iz obnovljivih izvora, na\u0161i vodni resursi nisu iskori\u0161teni. Ima starih planova hidro elektrana, ali iz nekih razloga nijedna Vlada RH nije pokrenula te projekte. Doma\u0107a proizvodnja nije dostatna za podmirenje ukupnih potreba. Tko smo ovisni o uvozu energenata, osobito naftnih derivata, plina i elektri\u010dne energije.\u00a0<br \/><br \/>Hrvatska ima gospodarske posljedice uvozne ovisnosti te veliki negativni utjecaj posljedica privatizacije INA-e na energetsku sigurnost Republike Hrvatske. Najtu\u017enije je to \u0161to su krivci za to Premijeri RH. Prvu prodaju 25% plus 1. dionicu, prodao je Ivica Ra\u010dan ma\u0111arskom MOL-u 2005. godine. Premijer Ivo Sanader je prodao putem fondova ostalih 24%, 2008. i 2009. godine tako da MOL ima 49% dionica sa upravlja\u010dkim pravima, ukupno za 505 milijuna dolara. \u0160to je ne zamislivo u poslovnom svijetu. Premijeru Sanaderu je na su\u0111enju dokazano da je primio mito za prodaju INE po takvim nepovoljnim za Hrvatsku uvjetima. Umjesto da Vlada iskoristi presudu suda i da poni\u0161ti koruptivni ugovor s MOL-om, Vlada RH se sporila se MOL-om i dva puta izgubila arbitra\u017eni spor na sudu 2022. godine i platila 300 milijuna dolara plus kamate, a drugi puta 246 milijuna dolara i kamate. Tako ispada da je Hrvatska vratila sav ulo\u017eeni kapital MOL-u koji je dobio INU besplatno. Toliko o stru\u010dnosti na\u0161e Vlade i njezinih pravnih savjetnika. INA je prodana s 49% udjela i upravlja\u010dkim pravima za samo 505 milijuna $, a u to vrijeme je vrijednost INE bila oko 3,5 milijarde $, a s nalazi\u0161tima nafte u Siriji i Belim No\u0107ima u Rusiji po procjeni stru\u010dnjaka najmanje 4,0 milijarde dolara, da ne ra\u010dunamo izgubljenu dobit.<\/p><p>Zatim slijedi \u00a0MOL-ovo netransparentno upravljanje INA-om i tada je biv\u0161i ministar gospodarstva i generalni direktor, a 2010.g. predsjednik Nadzornog odbora INA-e Davor Stern, upozoravao Vladu da MOL ne po\u0161tuje ugovor i da radi protiv interesa Republike Hrvatske. Ali Vlada nije reagirala na upozorenja. I MOL je prestao sa preradom nafte u rafineriji Sisak 2018.g. a 2022 zatvorio rafineriju u potpunosti. Uglavnom MOL prevozi na\u0161u naftu u ma\u0111arsku i Hrvatska uvozi derivate iz Ma\u0111arske. Rafinerija u Rijeci je bila dugo zatvorena radi rekonstrukcije i sada radi sa pola kapaciteta. Prakti\u010dki MOL iz Budimpe\u0161te upravlja s Hrvatskom naftom i preradom.<\/p><p>Sva sre\u0107a da se Vlada RH nije sjetila prodati Jadranski naftovod Omi\u0161alj i naftovod Dru\u017eba-Adria. MOL je bila mala kompanija koju je INA mogla kupiti bez problema \u00a0i danas mogla biti naftni gigant u ovoj regiji. Ali tada su vladali premijer Ivica Ra\u010dan i ministar financija Slavko Lini\u0107 koji su zagovarali politiku; \u201eprodaje\u201c i \u201este\u010daj je jedini izlaz\u201c i tako uni\u0161tili na\u0161u privredu. Nikada im nije palo na pamet da se energenti dr\u017eave ne prodaju strancima. Energetika, to je pitanje nacionalne sigurnosti.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>2.Nafta &#8211; uvozna ovisnost.<\/strong><\/p><p>Hrvatska godi\u0161nje proizvede pribli\u017eno 500 do 600 tisu\u0107a tona sirove nafte, dok ukupna potro\u0161nja vi\u0161estruko prema\u0161uje doma\u0107u proizvodnju. Zbog toga se najve\u0107i dio sirove nafte uvozi, uglavnom preko Omi\u0161aljskog terminala JANAF-a, odakle se doprema u Rafineriju Rijeka. Terminal JANAF je vezan sa Ruskim naftovodom Dru\u017eba Adria, putem koje se doprema nafta iz Rusije za Srbiju.<\/p><p>Naftni terminali u Hrvatskoj;<\/p><p>&#8211; JANAF Omi\u0161alj<\/p><p>&#8211; Virje<\/p><p>&#8211; Sisak<\/p><p>&#8211; \u017ditnjak \u2013 Zagreb<\/p><p>&#8211; Zadar<\/p><p>&#8211; Plo\u010de<\/p><p>Rusija je nudila da se sagrade novi kapaciteti naftovoda 35 milijuna barela, zatim Multiprovod (Omi\u0161alj \u2013 Slavomski Brod) i Ju\u017eni tok plinovoda kroz Hrvatsku u ukupnoj vrijednosti od 3,5 milijarde dolara. Na projektu sam radio kao diplomat, a posebno je bila osobna molba Kremlja da razgovaram sa Predsjednikom RH i Vladom RH o realizaciji ove investicije, toliko je bilo interesa u Rusiji. Me\u0111utim Vlada premijera Sanadera zbog politike Zapada odbila sve prijedloge. \u0160to je ekonomski nonsens, jer tada jo\u0161 nije bilo naznaka Rusko Ukrajinskog rata. A u kona\u010dnici \u0107e rat jednom zavr\u0161iti i imali bi naftovode, multiprovod i plinovod sa zna\u010dajnim energetskim potencijalom od 50 milijuna barela koji bi bili lijepi izvor zarade kao i tranzita od Europskih zemalja za Hrvatsku. Ali na\u0161i politi\u010dari slu\u0161aju politiku Zapada, umjesto da rade za nacionalne interese Hrvatske.<\/p><p>Kako vidimo cijela Europska unija danas ima energetsku krizu zbog obustave ruske nafte i plina, a BDP im je zbog dvostruko skupih zapadnih energenata na nuli. Danas se prerada nafte odvija isklju\u010divo u Rafineriji Rijeka, nakon \u0161to je prerada u Sisku uga\u0161ena. Modernizirana rije\u010dka rafinerija raspola\u017ee instaliranim kapacitetom od oko 4,5 milijuna tona godi\u0161nje, \u0161to predstavlja dovoljno velik kapacitet za preradu sirove nafte za hrvatsko tr\u017ei\u0161te i dio regionalnih potreba.Unato\u010d tome, Hrvatska i dalje zna\u010dajan dio benzina i posebno dizelskog goriva podmiruje uvozom. Razlozi su tr\u017ei\u0161na kretanja, struktura potra\u017enje, raspolo\u017eivost pojedinih proizvoda te poslovna politika INA-e unutar MOL Grupe, koja radi za interese ma\u0111arske strane. Time doma\u0107e tr\u017ei\u0161te ostaje osjetljivo na promjene cijena na me\u0111unarodnim tr\u017ei\u0161tima.<\/p><p><br \/>3.Prirodni plin \u2013 ve\u0107a sigurnost zahvaljuju\u0107i LNG terminalu<\/p><p>Hrvatska proizvodi pribli\u017eno 35 do 40 % vlastitih potreba za prirodnim plinom, dok se ostatak uvozi. Proizvodnja se kre\u0107e oko 0,8 do 1,0 milijarde kubi\u010dnih metara godi\u0161nje, dok ukupna potro\u0161nja iznosi pribli\u017eno 2,6 do 2,9 milijardi kubi\u010dnih metara. Najve\u0107a promjena dogodila se pu\u0161tanjem u rad LNG terminala na Krku. Hrvatska je time dobila mogu\u0107nost nabave ukapljenog prirodnog plina iz razli\u010ditih dijelova svijeta, uklju\u010duju\u0107i SAD, Katar, Nigeriju, Azerbajd\u017ean i Al\u017eir. \u010cime je zna\u010dajno smanjena ovisnost o jednom dobavnom pravcu. Me\u0111utim taj plin je puno skuplji od Ruskog plina.<br \/><br \/>Kada sam radio u diplomaciji na uspostavi diplomatskih odnosa sa Turkmenistanom 1992. g. ugovorio sam uvoz plina 1,5 milijardi kubi\u010dnih metara godi\u0161nje za Hrvatsku u kliringu je bio po 30% povoljniim cijenama i ugovor se odvijao osam godina. Logistika transporta je bila preko plinovoda Gazproma, a kupac u Hrvatskoj tada monopolist plina INA. Paradoksalno, Hrvatska danas nije potpuno plinski samodostatna, ali raspola\u017ee infrastrukturom koja omogu\u0107uje uvoz koli\u010dina plina ve\u0107ih od vlastite potro\u0161nje te opskrbu susjednih dr\u017eava koji su u velikim problemima zbog rata Rusije u Ukrajini i sankcija ruskog plina.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>4.Elektri\u010dna energija \u2013 gotovo samodostatni, ali ne u potpunosti<\/strong><\/p><p>Hrvatska godi\u0161nje proizvede oko 15 TWh elektri\u010dne energije, \u0161to iznosi 90% na\u0161ih potreba, a pri \u010demu proizvodnja ovisi o tr\u017ei\u0161nim i hidrolo\u0161kim prilikama.<\/p><p>Proizvodnja elektri\u010dne energije u Hrvatskoj:<\/p><p>nuklearna energija 10,16%, <br \/>nafta 3,33%, <br \/>plin 33,58%, <br \/>ugljen 21,25%,<br \/>sunce 10,87%,<br \/>voda 6,94%,<br \/>biomasa 6,65%, <br \/>ostalo 7,22%.<\/p><p>Tako da oko 73% \u00a0dolazi iz \u201ezelenih\u201c izvora. Ukupna doma\u0107a potro\u0161nja ne\u0161to je ve\u0107a, zbog \u010dega se dio elektri\u010dne energije redovito uvozi putem zajedni\u010dkog europskog tr\u017ei\u0161ta. Najva\u017eniji izvori proizvodnje su; &#8211;<\/p><p>hidroelektrane, <br \/>nuklearna elektrana Kr\u0161ko (hrvatski udio), <br \/>termoelektrane, <br \/>vjetroelektrane, <br \/>sun\u010dane elektrane, <br \/>biomasa i <br \/>geotermalni izvori.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p>U godinama s manjkom oborina proizvodnja hidroelektrana znatno pada, \u0161to pove\u0107ava potrebu za uvozom elektri\u010dne energije. Upravo zbog toga razvoj sun\u010danih elektrana, baterijskih spremnika energije i modernizacija prijenosne mre\u017ee i kori\u0161tenje geotermalnih izvora predstavljaju va\u017ene preduvjete dugoro\u010dne energetske sigurnosti.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>5.Ekonomske posljedice uvozne ovisnosti<\/strong><\/p><p>Svaka tona uvezene nafte, svaki kubi\u010dni metar uvezenog plina i svaki megavatsat uvezene elektri\u010dne energije zna\u010de odljev kapitala iz hrvatskog gospodarstva. Kada cijene energenata rastu, rastu i tro\u0161kovi proizvodnje, inflacija te izdaci ku\u0107anstava druge strane, pove\u0107anje doma\u0107e proizvodnje i prerade energenata ostavlja ve\u0107u dodanu vrijednost u Hrvatskoj kroz nova radna mjesta, porezne prihode, investicije i ve\u0107u otpornost gospodarstva na me\u0111unarodne poreme\u0107aje.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>Zaklju\u010dak<\/strong><\/p><p>Hrvatska nije energetski bogata dr\u017eava. Me\u0111utim posjeduje ne\u0161to vlastite proizvodnje nafte. Imamo 43<\/p><p>eksploatacijska polja, u podru\u010dju Panonskog bazena (Slavonija, Moslavina Podravina) cjelokupnu doma\u0107u proizvodnju vr\u0161i INA. Ne\u0161to prirodnog plina, elektri\u010dne energije 17 velikih hidroelektrana ) snage ve\u0107e od 10 MV, i 20 malih hidroelektrana, te desetak tisu\u0107a vjetroelektrana i sun\u010danih elektrana (35.000, u distribucijsku mre\u017eu spojeno je 10.000 ve\u010dih solarnih elektrana ).<\/p><p>Hrvatska je suvlasnik 50% Slovenske nuklearne elektrane i ima razvijen elektroenergetski sustav. Jadranski naftovod (JANAF, duljine 610 km) kapaciteta 20 milijuna tona godi\u0161nje, Dru\u017eba &#8211; Adria naftovod, LNG terminal Omi\u0161alj, Sisak, \u017ditnjak \u2013Zagreb, Virje i Slavonski Brod. Spojen je na me\u0111unarodni plinovod iz Ma\u0111arske koji se spaja kod Donjeg Miholjca i omogu\u010dije dvosmjerni transport plina, a Ma\u0111ari su spojeni na Ruski plinovod, i po novom je spojen na Turski plinovod koji preko preko Bugarske i Srbije ulazi u Ma\u0111arsku.<\/p><p>Osim toga imamo zna\u010dajan potencijal obnovljivih izvora energije. Ipak, Hrvatska jo\u0161 uvijek nije energetski suverena jer zna\u010dajan dio nafte, naftnih derivata, prirodnog plina i elektri\u010dne energije osigurava uvozom.<\/p><p>Jedan od razloga prividne dostatnosti energenata u Hrvatskoj jest taj \u0161to smo od 1990. g. izgubili zbog pretvorbe i privatizacije 90% privredne proizvodnje tako da u Hrvatskoj prevladavaju tercijarni sektori usluga i turizma koji ne zahtijevaju veliku energetsku potro\u0161nju.<\/p><p>Ja\u010danje energetske suverenosti zahtijeva pove\u0107anje doma\u0107e privredne proizvodnje, u\u010dinkovitije kori\u0161tenje prirodnih resursa. Nu\u017ean je razvoj obnovljivih izvora energije te sna\u017ena ulaganja u preradbenu i elektroenergetsku infrastrukturu.<\/p><p>Energetska politika pritom ne bi smjela biti isklju\u010divo tr\u017ei\u0161no pitanje, ve\u0107 dio dugoro\u010dne gospodarske i sigurnosne strategije Republike Hrvatske. U vremenu sve izra\u017eenijih geopoliti\u010dkih napetosti, energetska suverenost postaje jedno od najva\u017enijih razvojnih pitanja hrvatskog gospodarstva. Dr\u017eava koja mo\u017ee proizvesti i preraditi ve\u0107i dio vlastite energije nije samo gospodarski otpornija, ve\u0107 i politi\u010dki neovisnija te konkurentnija u europskom okru\u017eenju.<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p>Napomena uredni\u0161tva:<\/p><p>Razmi\u0161ljanja i stavovi u ovom tekstu rezultat su autorova pristupa utemeljenog u ideji slobode mi\u0161ljenja u podru\u010dju energetske politike i diplomatskog iskustva.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-tab-title elementor-tab-mobile-title\" aria-selected=\"false\" data-tab=\"2\" role=\"tab\" tabindex=\"-1\" aria-controls=\"elementor-tab-content-4922\" aria-expanded=\"false\">English<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<div id=\"elementor-tab-content-4922\" class=\"elementor-tab-content elementor-clearfix\" data-tab=\"2\" role=\"tabpanel\" aria-labelledby=\"elementor-tab-title-4922\" tabindex=\"0\" hidden=\"hidden\"><p>Diplomat, PhD Karino Hromin Sturm, Zagreb<\/p><p>\u00a0<\/p><p><strong>ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY OF CROATIA FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE<\/strong><\/p><p><br \/><strong>1. Between natural resources, import dependence and strategic decisions<\/strong><\/p><p>Energy sovereignty today represents one of the key pillars of the economic security of every country. Although Croatia has its own oil and natural gas reserves and significant potential for the production of electricity from renewable sources, our water resources have not been used. There are old plans for hydroelectric power plants, but for some reason no Croatian government has launched these projects. Domestic production is not sufficient to meet overall needs. We are dependent on the import of energy sources, especially oil derivatives, gas and electricity.<\/p><p>Croatia has the economic consequences of import dependence and the great negative impact of the privatization of INA on the energy security of the Republic of Croatia. The saddest thing is that the Prime Ministers of the Republic of Croatia are to blame for this. The first sale of 25% plus 1 share was sold by Ivica Ra\u010dan to the Hungarian MOL in 2005. Prime Minister Ivo Sanader sold the remaining 24% through funds in 2008 and 2009, so that MOL has 49% of the shares with management rights, for a total of 505 million dollars.<\/p><p>Which is unthinkable in the business world. Prime Minister Sanader was proven at trial that he received a bribe for the sale of INA on such unfavorable terms for Croatia. Instead of the Government taking advantage of the court ruling and annulling the corrupt contract with MOL, the Government of the Republic of Croatia argued with MOL and lost the arbitration dispute in court twice in 2022 and paid 300 million dollars plus interest, and the second time 246 million dollars plus interest. So it turns out that Croatia returned all the invested capital to MOL, which received INA for free. So much for the expertise of our Government and its legal advisors. INA was sold with a 49% stake and management rights for only $505 million, and at that time the value of INA was around $3.5 billion, and with oil fields in Syria and White Nights in Russia, according to experts, at least $4.0 billion, not to mention lost profits.<\/p><p>Then followed MOL&#8217;s non-transparent management of INA, and then the former Minister of Economy and CEO, and in 2010 the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of INA Davor Stern, warned the Government that MOL was not respecting the contract and was working against the interests of the Republic of Croatia. But the Government did not react to the warnings. MOL also stopped refining oil at the Sisak refinery in 2018 and closed the refinery completely in 2022. MOL mainly transports our oil to Hungary and Croatia imports derivatives from Hungary. The refinery in Rijeka was closed for a long time for reconstruction and is now operating at half capacity. Practically, MOL from Budapest manages Croatian oil and refining.<\/p><p>Fortunately, the Government of the Republic of Croatia did not think to sell the Adriatic pipeline Omi\u0161alj and the Dru\u017eba-Adria pipeline. MOL was a small company that INA could have bought without any problems and today could be an oil giant in this region. But then Prime Minister Ivica Ra\u010dan and Finance Minister Slavko Lini\u0107 ruled, who advocated politics; &#8220;sales&#8221; and &#8220;bankruptcy is the only way out&#8221; and thus destroyed our economy. It never occurred to them that the state&#8217;s energy products are not sold to foreigners. Energy is a matter of national security.<\/p><p><strong>2.Oil &#8211; import dependence.<\/strong><\/p><p>Croatia produces approximately 500 to 600 thousand tons of crude oil annually, while total consumption exceeds domestic production many times over. Therefore, the largest part of crude oil is imported, mainly through the Omi\u0161alj JANAF terminal, from where it is delivered to the Rijeka Refinery. The JANAF terminal is connected to the Russian Druzhba Adria oil pipeline, through which oil is delivered from Russia to Serbia.<\/p><p>Oil terminals in Croatia;<\/p><p>&#8211; JANAF Omi\u0161alj<\/p><p>&#8211; Virje<\/p><p>&#8211; Sisak<\/p><p>&#8211; \u017ditnjak \u2013 Zagreb<\/p><p>&#8211; Zadar<\/p><p>&#8211; Plo\u010de<\/p><p>Russia offered to build new oil pipeline capacities of 35 million barrels, then Multiprovod (Omi\u0161alj \u2013 Slavomski Brod) and the South Stream gas pipeline through Croatia with a total value of 3.5 billion dollars. I worked on the project as a diplomat, and in particular there was a personal request from the Kremlin to talk to the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia about the implementation of this investment, there was so much interest in Russia. However, the government of Prime Minister Sanader rejected all the proposals due to the Western policy. Which is economic nonsense, because at that time there were no signs of the Russian-Ukrainian war. And in the end, the war will end one day and we would have oil pipelines, a multi-pipeline and a gas pipeline with a significant energy potential of 50 million barrels that would be a nice source of income as well as transit from European countries to Croatia. But our politicians listen to the Western policy, instead of working for the national interests of Croatia.<\/p><p>As we can see, the entire European Union today has an energy crisis due to the suspension of Russian oil and gas, and their GDP is at zero due to the twice as expensive Western energy sources. Today, oil processing takes place exclusively in the Rijeka Refinery, after the processing in Sisak was shut down. The modernized Rijeka refinery has an installed capacity of about 4.5 million tons per year, which is a large enough capacity to process crude oil for the Croatian market and part of the regional needs.<\/p><p>Despite this, Croatia still imports a significant part of its gasoline and especially diesel fuel. The reasons are market trends, demand structure, availability of certain products and INA&#8217;s business policy within the MOL Group, which works for the interests of the Hungarian side. This leaves the domestic market vulnerable to price changes on international markets.<\/p><p><strong>3. Natural gas \u2013 greater security thanks to the LNG terminal<\/strong><\/p><p>Croatia produces approximately 35 to 40% of its own natural gas needs, while the rest is imported. Production ranges from 0.8 to 1.0 billion cubic meters per year, while total consumption is approximately 2.6 to 2.9 billion cubic meters. The biggest change occurred with the commissioning of the LNG terminal on Krk. This gave Croatia the opportunity to purchase liquefied natural gas from various parts of the world, including the USA, Qatar, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and Algeria. This significantly reduced dependence on a single supply route. However, this gas is much more expensive than Russian gas.<\/p><p>When I worked in diplomacy to establish diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan in 1992, I contracted the import of 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year for Croatia, the clearing price was 30% cheaper, and the contract ran for eight years. The logistics of the transport were via the Gazprom gas pipeline, and the buyer in Croatia was the gas monopolist at the time, INA. Paradoxically, Croatia is not completely self-sufficient in gas today, but it has the infrastructure that allows it to import quantities of gas greater than its own consumption and supply neighboring countries that are in great trouble due to Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russian gas.<\/p><p><strong>4.Electricity \u2013 almost self-sufficient, but not completely<\/strong><\/p><p>Croatia produces around 15 TWh of electricity annually, which is 90% of our needs, with production depending on market and hydrological conditions.<\/p><p>Electricity production in Croatia:<\/p><p>&#8211; nuclear energy 10.16%,<\/p><p>&#8211; oil 3.33%,<\/p><p>&#8211; gas 33.58%,<\/p><p>&#8211; coal 21.25%,<\/p><p>&#8211; solar 10.87%,<\/p><p>&#8211; water 6.94%,<\/p><p>&#8211; biomass 6.65%,<\/p><p>&#8211; other 7.22%.<\/p><p>So around 73% comes from \u201cgreen\u201d sources. Total domestic consumption is somewhat higher, which is why part of the electricity is regularly imported via the common European market. The most important sources of production are; &#8211;<\/p><p>&#8211; hydroelectric power plants,<\/p><p>&#8211; nuclear power plant Kr\u0161ko (Croatian share),<\/p><p>&#8211; thermal power plants,<\/p><p>&#8211; wind power plants,<\/p><p>&#8211; solar power plants,<\/p><p>&#8211; biomass and<\/p><p>&#8211; geothermal sources.<\/p><p>In years with a lack of precipitation, the production of hydroelectric power plants drops significantly, which increases the need for imported electricity. This is precisely why the development of solar power plants, battery energy storage and the modernization of the transmission network and the use of geothermal sources represent important prerequisites for long-term energy security.<\/p><p><strong>5. Economic consequences of import dependence<\/strong><\/p><p>Every ton of imported oil, every cubic meter of imported gas and every megawatt-hour of imported electricity means an outflow of capital from the Croatian economy. When energy prices rise, so do production costs, inflation and household spending on the other hand, increasing domestic production and processing of energy products leaves more added value in Croatia through new jobs, tax revenues, investments and greater resilience of the economy to international shocks.<\/p><p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p><p>Croatia is not an energy-rich country. However, it has some of its own oil production. We have exploitation fields, in the Pannonian Basin (Slavonia, Moslavina Podravina) all domestic production is carried out by INA. Some natural gas, electricity 17 large hydroelectric power plants ) with a capacity of more than 10 MW, and 20 small hydroelectric power plants, and about ten thousand wind farms and solar power plants (35,000, 10,000 larger solar power plants are connected to the distribution network).<\/p><p>Croatia is a co-owner of 50% of the Slovenian nuclear power plant and has a developed electricity system. Adriatic oil pipeline (JANAF, 610 km long) with a capacity of 20 million tons per year, Dru\u017eba &#8211; Adria oil pipeline, LNG terminals Omi\u0161alj, Sisak, \u017ditnjak &#8211; Zagreb, Virje and Slavonski Brod. It is connected to the international gas pipeline from Hungary, which connects at Donji Miholjac and enables two-way gas transport, and the Hungarians are connected to the Russian gas pipeline, and is now connected to the Turkish gas pipeline that enters Hungary via Bulgaria and Serbia.<\/p><p>In addition, we have significant potential for renewable energy sources. However, Croatia is still not energy sovereign because a significant part of oil, oil derivatives, natural gas and electricity is secured by imports.<\/p><p>One of the reasons for the apparent sufficiency of energy sources in Croatia is that since 1990, we have lost 90% of economic production due to transformation and privatization, so that tertiary sectors of services and tourism that do not require large energy consumption prevail in Croatia.<\/p><p>Strengthening energy sovereignty requires an increase in domestic economic production, more efficient use of natural resources. The development of renewable energy sources and strong investments in processing and electricity infrastructure are necessary.<\/p><p>Energy policy should not be exclusively a market issue, but part of the long-term economic and security strategy of the Republic of Croatia. In a time of increasing geopolitical tensions, energy sovereignty is becoming one of the most important development issues for the Croatian economy. A country that can produce and process a larger part of its own energy is not only more economically resilient, but also more politically independent and competitive in the European environment.<\/p><p>Editorial note:<\/p><p>The thoughts and views in this text are the result of the author&#8217;s approach based on the idea of \u200b\u200bfreedom of thought in the field of energy policy and diplomatic experience.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Hrvatski English Hrvatski Diplomat, dr.sc.Karino Hromin Sturm , Zagreb \u00a0 1.Izme\u0111u prirodnih resursa, uvozne ovisnosti i strate\u0161kih odluka Energetska suverenost [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4146,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"default","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"set","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center 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