Davorin Brkić, mag. ing. el. techn. inf.,
Sektor za električnu energiju,
Hrvatska energetska regulatorna agencija1
Energetska suverenost nije isto što i energetska samodostatnost. Povijest hrvatske elektroenergetike pokazuje da su ključne odluke o elektranama, prekograničnim razmjenama električne energije i energetskim tehnologijama bile povezane sa širim političkim okruženjem. Danas Hrvatska unutar Europske unije ima ograničenja, ali i mogućnost strateškog energetskog izbora.
1.Energetska suverenost nije isto što i samodostatnost
Energetsku suverenost Sergio Tirado Herrero definirao je kao „pravo pojedinaca, zajednica i država da samostalno donose odluke o proizvodnji, distribuciji i uporabi energije kako bi zadovoljili svoje potrebe za energetskim uslugama na načine koji su primjereni njihovim ekološkim, gospodarskim, društvenim i kulturnim uvjetima.“2 Energetska samodostatnost može samo ponekad biti ishod energetske suverenosti. Primjerice, kada država suvereno usmjeri svoju politiku i ulaganja prema postizanju energetske samodostatnosti.
Quentin Skinner se pozabavio konceptom neovisnosti i konceptom države kroz povijest. Oprečni su pogledi na državu i na neovisnost. Suverenost je sposobnost izdavanja zapovijedi bez mogućnosti primanja zapovijedi na vlastitom području vladavine. Međutim, nakon Prvoga svjetskoga rata države su prema toj definiciji prestale biti suverene, jer je 1922. uspostavljen Međunarodni sud pravde. Počelo se govoriti o odumiranju i smrti države. Skinner smatra da suverenitet države, iako umanjen, nije iščezao. Države ostaju važni i jedinstveni igrači na svjetskoj razini. Na vlastitom području, barem u razvijenim državama, ostaju ključni igrači.
Takvo razumijevanje suverenosti u kontekstu energetike ne govori o potpunoj neovisnosti, nego o prostoru u kojem država, unatoč međunarodnim ograničenjima, zadržava mogućnost donošenja ključnih odluka.
Timothy Snyder u 2026. godini iznosi tezu da nam povijest služi da bismo vidjeli što je ono što je zapravo moguće, dok oni koje povijest ne zanima zabrazde u stanje gdje otežano mijenjaju stvarnost, jer ne znaju što je moguće3.
U nastavku se na povijesnim primjerima prikazuje koliko je u prošlosti hrvatska energetska sudbina mogla biti ishod suverenih energetskih odluka, a i koliko je ona to u okviru kućnog reda koji vlada u Europskoj uniji.
2.Hrvatska prije EU: odluke koje su oblikovale sustav
Prvi povijesni doktorat o razvoju jugoslavenske elektroenergetike do 1990. obranila je Tijana Rupčić 2025. godine, što pokazuje da postoji zanimanje profesionalnih povjesničara za dotičnu tematiku.
Hrvatska i Slovenija su nakon NE Krško trebale zajednički graditi nuklearnu elektranu u Hrvatskoj. Hrvatska je u Jugoslaviji bila ovisna o uvozu električne energije. Skupština Jugoslavije, na poticaj Slovenije, donijela je 27. prosinca 1988. odluku o moratoriju na izgradnju nuklearnih elektrana, čime je došla u pitanje izgradnja dugoselske NE Prevlaka u Hrvatskoj. Prethodno je Zajednica jugoslavenske elektroprivrede (JUGEL) zajedno s tri druge institucije iskazala protivljenje moratoriju na izgradnju nuklearnih elektrana u Jugoslaviji.
Pri razmatranju nuklearnoga programa valja uvažiti složevinu ekološkoga antinuklearnoga pokreta u Jugoslaviji i totalitarne naravi jugoslavenskoga sustava, koji je upravljao medijima možebitno i za međurepubličke obračune. U kontekst treba uvesti republičke postupke povezane uz naslućivani raspad Jugoslavije i uz trajanje izgradnje nuklearne elektrane. Nije za zanemariti ni prednost koje su imale pojedine jugoslavenske republike s energentima na svojem teritoriju uz istovremenu mogućnost izvoza električne energije, poput elektrana uz ugljenokope.
Suradnja s drugim državama bila je do 1990. opterećena marksističkim uvjerenjima koja su bila službena državna ideologija. Davor Marijan u svoj knjizi iz 2026. o Hrvatskoj u 1980-ima analizom povjerljivih dokumenata Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, primjećuje da su se na sjednicama čudili kako se Kardeljeva teorijska rješenja izvedena iz marksističkih klasika ne ostvaruju u praksi4.
Primjerice, hrvatski komunisti nastojali su omogućiti izgradnju autoceste i istraživanje podmorja u suradnji s talijanskim gospodarstvom dajući talijanskoj strani koncesije. Hrvatski komunisti, nastojeći da se ostvare ti projekti – bezuspješno su pokušali 1966. dokazati da lenjinizam nije bio protiv koncesija jer da koncesija po hrvatskim komunistima ne dovodi do „rasprodaje socijalizma“.
Slovenija (ELES) je bila isključila vod prema Republici Hrvatskoj iz NE Krško što je trajalo od srpnja 1998. do travnja 2003. U razdoblju tijekom zime s 1998. na 1999. sustav su održavali TE Sisak i TE Rijeka kada je potrošeno više od 200 tisuća tona ne-ekološkoga mazuta.
3.Ulazak u EU: manje samostalnosti ili drukčiji oblik suverenosti?
Hrvatski sabor 2012. prihvatio je Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije. Članak 194. Ugovora među ostalim definira cilj osiguranja sigurnosti opskrbe energije u Europskoj uniji, kao i da Europski parlament i Vijeće utvrđuju mjere potrebne za ostvarenje ciljeva. Istodobno propisuje da dotične mjere ne utječu na pravo države članice da utvrđuje uvjete za iskorištavanje svojih energetskih resursa, svoj izbor među različitim izvorima energije i opću strukturu svoje opskrbe energijom.
Europska komisija 12. ožujka 2025. objavila je mišljenje o neažuriranju Integriranog nacionalnog energetskog i klimatskog plana (NECP) za Belgiju, Estoniju, Hrvatsku, Poljsku i Slovačku u smislu povrede EU prava (infringement), dok je Vlada Republike Hrvatske već 26. ožujka 2025. donijela ažuriranu inačicu NECP-a. NECP je plan mjera za ostvarivanje dogovorenih ciljeva EU-a u pogledu emisija stakleničkih plinova, obnovljivih izvora energije i energetske učinkovitosti. U NECP-u su po odabranim godinama prikazani ciljani MW-i elektrana po vrstama izvora za proizvodnju električne energije.
Ciljne snage po vrstama izvora iz NECP-a su onda ulazni podatak za EU analizu dugoročne sigurnosti opskrbe u Hrvatskoj (ERAA) koju provodi Udruženje operatora prijenosnih sustava za električnu energiju (ENTSO-E). Ako ERAA pokaže da je dugoročna sigurnost opskrbe u Hrvatskoj ugrožena, tada Hrvatska po EU propisima ima mogućnost uz prihode koje proizvođači imaju od prodaje električne energije uvesti za njih i dodatan sustav za poticanje izgradnje elektrana (mehanizam za kapacitete). U slučaju kada ERAA pokaže da je sigurnost opskrbe u Hrvatskoj zadovoljena, tada Hrvatska ima pravo napraviti nacionalnu analizu sigurnosti opskrbe (NRAA), a ako se rezultati NRAA-e razlikuju od rezultata ERAA-e, NRAA se pod određenim uvjetima može prihvatiti.
EU je uvela nešto poput carina za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Srbiju i druge države izvan EU na uvoz električne energije u EU, što se odnosi i na uvoz u Hrvatsku (CBAM). CBAM-om se nastoji riješiti nejednakost gdje su u nepovoljnijem položaju bili proizvođači električne energije iz EU, koji su obvezni plaćati za emisije ugljičnoga dioksida, u odnosu na proizvođače izvan EU koji to nisu bili dužni. Navedeno je od početka 2026. dovelo do znatnog utjecaja na veleprodajne cijene i ekonomske razmjene električne energije.
4.Hrvatska elektroenergetika danas: model tržišta, uvoz i vlastiti izvori
Neto preuzimanje električne energije iz drugih država u hrvatsku mrežu na godišnjoj je razini od 2016. do 2025. bilo od 12 do 41 % (uvoz), a u uvoz je uključena polovica proizvodnje iz NE Krško (oko 2,7 TWh). Preuzimanje iz mreže od potrošača s gubitcima električne energije u prijenosu i distribuciji je u tome razdoblju najveće bilo 2025. (19,1 TWh) a najniže 2020. (17,2 TWh). Udio hidroelektrične energije predane u mrežu bio je od 28 do 41 %. Stalan je trend povećanja udjela iz vjetroelektrana: od 6 % 2016. do 16 % 2025. Fosilni izvori su od 16 do 26 %.
Prethodno navedeni podatci predstavljaju razmjenu električne energije s mrežom. Dio proizvedene električne energije potroši se unutar građevine i tako ostane nezabilježen kao predaja u mrežu. U distribucijskoj mreži: priključna snaga sunčanih elektrana je u svibnju 2026. bila 1,3 GW (60 % na niskom naponu) na 48 tisuća objekata (99 % na niskom naponu).
Razlika između električne energije i fosilnih goriva je u tome što je električnu energiju ekonomski neopravdanije prenositi na velike udaljenosti. Tako između Europe i SAD-a uopće nema razmjene električne energije, dok Europa iz SAD uvozi ukapljeni prirodni plin (UPP). Usput rečeno SAD i EU imaju paradigmatski drukčije veleprodajno tržište električne energije, gdje u Europskoj uniji područja s jednakom veleprodajnom cijenom u četvrtsatnom intervalu uglavnom prate državne granice (zonal pricing), a u SAD su cijene prostorno nejednolikije (nodal pricing). EU tijelo za istraživanje Joint Research Centre je 2024. zaključilo da je potrebno udvostručiti broj područja trgovanja, čime bi se poboljšala sigurnost opskrbe uz znatne ekonomske koristi.
Kada su plinske elektrane potrebne za namirenje potrošnje u četvrtsatnom intervalu, tada cijene prirodnog plina uglavnom određuju europsku veleprodajnu cijenu struje (marginal pricing). Za razliku od hrane, sva električna energija za veleprodajno tržište ima jednaku kakvoću, a u istoj zoni trgovanja (npr. teritorij Republike Hrvatske) i jednaku veleprodajnu burzovnu cijenu u istom trenutku za isti vremenski interval. Od 2021. godine u EU se uočava snažnija korelacija cijena električne energije i prirodnoga plina. Prilikom šokova koje su izazvale ekstremne veleprodajne cijene električne energije u 2022., bit euro unijskog modela tržišta električne energije najbolje je objasnio Lion Hirth: popis ekonomskog prvenstva (merit order list) i načelo granične cijene (marginal pricing).
Proizvodnja električne energije iz prirodnog plina u europskom elektroenergetskom sustavu bila je 14 % u 2025.5 EU je 2025. godine 90 % ovisila o uvozu plina. Hrvatska je u 2025. proizvela prirodni plin energetske vrijednosti 6,5 TWh, na terminalu za UPP ušlo je 24,2 TWh a na maloprodajnom tržištu je prodano 27,3 TWh. Hrvatska je 2025. godine 68 % UPP-a uvozila iz SAD-a, a ostatak od drugih država: Trinidad i Tobago 16 %, Alžir 12 % i Nigerija 4 %. Uvoz prirodnog plina cjevovodima iz Rusije za EU pao je s 47 % u 2019. na 7 % u 2025., dok je 2025. Rusija sudjelovala s ukupno 12 % u opskrbi Europe prirodnim plinom.6 Pad je ishod rata u Ukrajini.
Osim globalne trgovine UPP-om, koja utječe i na proizvodnju električne energije, važna je i globalna razmjena energetskih tehnologija. Primjer su današnji uvoz baterija i sunčanih elektrana iz Kine te nekadašnji uvoz američke nuklearne tehnologije za NE Krško, iz koje HEP i danas preuzima električnu energiju.
5.Energetska suverenost u tri dimenzije
Hrvatska elektroenergetika u okviru Europske unije, ovisno o promatranom pitanju, istodobno ima lokalnu, europsku i globalnu dimenziju. Sama za sebe Hrvatska nije energetski samodostatna, a u okviru pravnog okvira Europske unije samostalno odlučuje o iskorištavanju svojih energetskih resursa i, u okviru pravne stečevine Europske unije, sudjeluje u uređivanju prekogranične trgovine energijom.
5. kolovoza 2026., Zagreb
Izvori:
Izvor za postotke i količine energije: HERA (2026.), Izvješće o radu Hrvatske energetske regulatorne agencije u 2025. godini, https://www.hera.hr/hr/html/god_izv.html
Ostali izvori: radovi autora teksta
1 Stavovi izneseni u ovome tekstu su osobna mišljenja autora, nisu obvezujući za poduzeće/instituciju u kojoj je autor zaposlen te se ne moraju nužno podudarati sa službenim stavovima poduzeća/institucije.
2 Tirado Herrero, S. (n.d.). Energy Sovereignity. In L. Lloredo Alix (Ed.), Dictionary on ecosocial justice: towards an ecocentric vocabulary. Retrieved July 24, 2026, https://www.speak4nature.eu/dictionary/energy-sovereignity/
3 Timothy Snyder: Hitler and Stalin Today: Class 1: What is History?, objavljeno 15. srpnja 2026., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQA9sYBSkTc
4 Davor Marijan (2026.), HRVATSKA ŠUTNJA I GODINE RASPLETA Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1980-ih, Hrvatski institut za povijest, str. 770.
6 https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/ACER-LNG-Monitoring-Report-2026.pdf str. 4. i 21., https://www.hera.hr/hr/docs/HERA_izvjesce_2025.pdf, str. 64. i 73.
Davorin Brkić, M.Sc. in Electrical Engineering and Information Technology,
Electricity Department,
Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency1
Croatia’s Electricity Sovereignty: Between Domestic Resources, EU Rules, and Global Interdependence
Energy sovereignty is not the same as energy self-sufficiency. The history of Croatia’s electricity sector shows that key decisions regarding power plants, cross-border interconnections, and energy technologies have been linked to the broader political environment. Today, within the European Union, Croatia faces certain constraints, but also has the opportunity to make strategic energy choices.
1.Energy sovereignty is not synonymous with energy self-sufficiency
Sergio Tirado Herrero defines energy sovereignty as “the right of individuals, communities, and nations to make autonomous decisions on the generation, distribution, and use of energy to meet their energy service needs in ways that are appropriate to their ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions.”2 Energy self-sufficiency may only occasionally be the outcome of energy sovereignty. For example, when a state sovereignly decides to direct its policies and redirect investment towards energy self-sufficiency and succeeds in achieving it.
Quentin Skinner has examined the concept of independence (liberty) and the concept of state throughout history. Competing views exist regarding both the nature of the state and the meaning of independence. Sovereignty may be understood as the ability to command without being subject to commands within one’s own jurisdiction. However, according to this definition, states ceased to be fully sovereign after the First World War, when the Court of International Justice was established in 1922. This gave rise to discussions about the decline and even the death of the state. Skinner argues that although state sovereignty according to his definition has been diminished, sovereignty of the state has not disappeared. States remain important and unique actors on the global stage, and within their own territories, at least in developed countries, they continue to play the key roles.
Such an understanding of sovereignty in the energy context does not imply complete independence but rather a sphere in which the state, despite international constraints, retains the ability to make key decisions.
In 2026, Timothy Snyder argues that history demonstrates what is possible, whereas those who disregard history often find it harder to change reality because they do not know what is possible.
The following historical examples illustrate how Croatia’s energy future has been shaped by sovereign energy decisions in the past and how much room for such decisions still exists within the European Union’s legal framework.
2.Croatia Before Joining the EU: Decisions That Shaped the System
The first doctoral dissertation in history devoted to the development of the electricity sector in Yugoslavia (which Croatia was part of) up to 1990 was defended by Tijana Rupčić in 2025, demonstrating that professional historians have developed an interest in this field.
Following the construction of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia, Croatia and Slovenia had planned to jointly build another nuclear power plant in Croatia. Within Yugoslavia, Croatia depended on electricity imports. On 27 December 1988, at Slovenia’s initiative, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants, thereby jeopardizing the planned Nuclear Power Plant in Croatia (NE Prevlaka). Prior to this decision, the Association of Yugoslav Electric Utilities (JUGEL), together with three other institutions, had expressed opposition to the moratorium.
The history of Yugoslavia’s nuclear programme may be understood in light of the environmental anti-nuclear movement within Yugoslavia, as well as the totalitarian nature of the Yugoslav political system, which controlled the media and may have misused it for inter-republic political struggles. The broader context also includes the actions of the individual republics in anticipation of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the long construction period required for nuclear power plants. Furthermore, certain Yugoslav republics possessed abundant fossil fuel resources and electricity exports, particularly those operating coal-fired power plants located near coal mines.
Before 1990, cooperation with other countries was constrained by Marxist beliefs, which constituted the official state ideology. In his 2026 book about Croatia in 1980s, Davor Marijan observes through an analysis of confidential documents of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia that, during their meetings, party officials expressed surprise that Kardelj’s theoretical solutions, derived from Marxist classics, were not being realized in practice4.
For example, Croatian communists sought to facilitate the construction of a motorway and offshore exploitation in cooperation with Italian companies by granting concessions to the Italian side. In an attempt to realize these projects, they unsuccessfully argued in 1966 that Leninism was not opposed to concessions and that granting concessions would not constitute a “sell-out of socialism”.
Slovenia’s transmission system operator (ELES) disconnected the transmission interconnection supplying electricity from the Krško Nuclear Power Plant to the Republic of Croatia, a situation that lasted from July 1998 until April 2003. During the winter of 1998–1999, Croatia’s electricity system relied on the Sisak and Rijeka thermal power plants, consuming more than 200,000 tonnes of environmentally unfriendly heavy fuel oil.
3.Joining the EU: A Loss of Autonomy or a New Form of Sovereignty?
The Croatian Parliament ratified the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in 2012. Among other provisions, Article 194 of the Treaty establishes the objective of ensuring the security of energy supply within the European Union. It also provides that the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, while stipulating that such measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources, or the general structure of its energy supply.
On 12 March 2025, the European Commission issued a reasoned opinion concerning the failure of Belgium, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, and Slovakia to submit updated Integrated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), in the context of infringement proceedings under EU law. On 26 March 2025, the Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted an updated version of its NECP. The NECP is a strategic document outlining measures to achieve the European Union’s agreed objectives concerning greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy sources, and energy efficiency. For selected target years, it specifies the planned installed generating capacity (MW) for different electricity generation technologies.
The installed capacity targets contained in the NECP constitute input data for the European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA), the European Union’s long-term electricity security of supply assessment conducted by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). If the ERAA indicates that Croatia’s long-term security of electricity supply is at risk, EU legislation allows Croatia to introduce, in addition to electricity energy-only market revenues, a capacity remuneration mechanism to encourage investment in new capacity (capacity mechanism). Conversely, if the ERAA concludes that Croatia’s security of supply is adequate, Croatia is entitled to conduct its own National Resource Adequacy Assessment (NRAA). Where the NRAA reaches conclusions different from those of the ERAA, its findings may, under specified conditions, be accepted through the procedures laid down in EU legislation.
The European Union has introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on electricity imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and other non-EU countries, including electricity imported into Croatia. CBAM is comparable to an interstate tariff. The purpose of the CBAM is to address the competitive disadvantage previously faced by electricity producers within the European Union, who are required to pay for carbon dioxide emissions, compared with producers outside the EU that were not subject to equivalent carbon pricing. Since the beginning of 2026, the implementation of the CBAM has had a significant impact on wholesale electricity prices and cross-border electricity trading.
4.Croatia’s Electricity Sector Today: Market Model, Imports and Domestic Sources
On an annual basis, Croatia’s net electricity imports from neighbouring countries accounted for between 12% and 41% of the electricity supplied to the Croatian transmission system between 2016 and 2025. These imports include Croatia’s 50% share of the electricity generated by the Krško Nuclear Power Plant (approximately 2.7 TWh). During the same period, total electricity withdrawn from the grid by consumers, including transmission and distribution losses, reached its highest level in 2025 (19.1 TWh) and its lowest in 2020 (17.2 TWh). The share of hydroelectricity delivered to the grid ranged from 28% to 41%. The contribution of wind electricity showed a steady upward trend, increasing from 6% in 2016 to 16% in 2025. Fossil-fuel-based generation accounted for between 16% and 26% of electricity supplied to the grid.
This data refers to electricity exchanged with the grid. However, a portion of the electricity generated is consumed on-site within the customer’s premises. As of May 2026, the total contracted power of photovoltaic systems on the distribution grid (35 kV and below) amounted to 1.3 GW of contracted grid injection electricity flow (contracted power in general is less than installed power, 60% connected to the low-voltage distribution network). These 1.3 GW were at approximately 48,000 sites, 99% of which were connected at the low-voltage level.
The principal difference between electricity and fossil fuels is that transmitting electricity over long distances is generally less economically viable. Consequently, there is no direct electricity trade between Europe and the United States, whereas Europe imports liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States. It is also worth noting that the wholesale electricity markets in the United States and the European Union are based on fundamentally different market designs. In the European Union, wholesale electricity price zones (bidding zones), meaning area with the same power exchange price, mainly follow national borders (zonal pricing), whereas in the United States wholesale electricity prices have high spatial granularity (nodal pricing). In 2024, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) concluded that the number of electricity bidding zones should be doubled, which would improve security of supply while creating substantial economic benefits.
Whenever gas-fired power plants are required to meet electricity demand during a fifteen-minute market settlement interval, natural gas prices largely determine the wholesale electricity price in Europe under the marginal pricing mechanism. Unlike food products, electricity traded on the wholesale market is homogeneous in quality. Within a given bidding zone (for example, the territory of the Republic of Croatia), all wholesale electricity is traded at the same market price at the power exchange at the same time for the same time interval. Since 2021, the correlation between electricity prices and natural gas prices in Europe has become very strong. During the shocks caused by extreme wholesale electricity prices in 2022, Lion Hirth provided the clearest explanation of the essence of the European Union’s electricity market model: the merit order list and marginal pricing.
Electricity generation from natural gas accounted for 14% of total electricity generation in the European power system in 20255. In 2025, the European Union gas demand depends for more than 90% on imports. In the same year, Croatia produced 6.5 TWh of natural gas, received 24.2 TWh through its LNG terminal, and sold 27.3 TWh on the retail gas market. In 2025, 68% of Croatia’s LNG imports originated from the United States, while the remainder came from Trinidad and Tobago (16%), Algeria (12%), and Nigeria (4%). Pipeline imports of natural gas from Russia into the European Union declined from 47% of total gas imports in 2019 to 7% in 2025, although Russia still accounted for 12% of Europe’s overall natural gas supply in 2025.6 This decline was a consequence of the war in Ukraine.
Beyond the global supply of LNG from the United States, which is used for electricity generation, the global dimension of the electricity sector is reflected in the international exchange of technology. Examples include Croatia’s current imports of batteries and photovoltaic systems from China, as well as its earlier import of American nuclear technology for the Krško Nuclear Power Plant, from which Hrvatska elektroprivreda (HEP) continues to receive electricity today.
5.Energy Sovereignty in Three Dimensions
The Croatian electricity sector therefore operates simultaneously at the local, European, and global dimension, although the relative importance of each dimension depends on the issue in question. Croatia is not energy self-sufficient on its own; nevertheless, within the legal framework of the European Union it retains the sovereign right to determine how its domestic energy resources are exploited and to make independent decisions regarding international energy trade.
August 5, 2026, Zagreb
Source for the percentages and energy quantities: Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (HERA) (2026), Annual Report on the Activities of the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency in 2025, https://www.hera.hr/hr/html/god_izv.html.
Other sources: the author’s publications
1 The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. They do not represent the official position of the company or institution by which the author is employed and should not be interpreted as reflecting its official policies or views.
2 Tirado Herrero, S. (n.d.). Energy Sovereignty. In L. Lloredo Alix (Ed.), Dictionary on ecosocial justice: towards an ecocentric vocabulary. Retrieved July 24, 2026, https://www.speak4nature.eu/dictionary/energy-sovereignity/
3 Timothy Snyder: Hitler and Stalin Today: Class 1: What is History?, published at 15th July 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQA9sYBSkTc
4 Davor Marijan (2026.), HRVATSKA ŠUTNJA I GODINE RASPLETA Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1980-ih, Croatian Institute of History, page 770.
6 https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/ACER-LNG-Monitoring-Report-2026.pdf pages 4 and 21, https://www.hera.hr/hr/docs/HERA_izvjesce_2025.pdf, pages 64 and 73