Dr. Andrej Pustišek
Hochschule für Technik Stuttgart,
2Pi-Energy Austria GmbH
Germany/Njemačka 

1.Plin je skup?

Plin je skup, skladišta zaostaju s punjenjem, a LNG nije zamjena za skladišta. To je neugodna početna pozicija Europe uoči zime. Dana 23. kolovoza skladišta prirodnog plina u EU-u bila su popunjena tek oko 62%. Godine 2025. bila su na 76%, dok je povijesni prosjek za isti datum iznosio 80%. EU i dalje ima cilj popuniti podzemna skladišta do 90%. Međutim, prema pravilima koja vrijede od 2025. do 2027., države članice sada imaju dvomjesečni rok – od 1. listopada do 1. prosinca – u kojem trebaju dosegnuti taj cilj. Od cilja mogu i odstupiti u slučaju teških tržišnih uvjeta ili tehničkih ograničenja.

2.Skladišta plina-amortizer plinskog sustava

Skladišta se mogu promatrati kao amortizer plinskog sustava. Podzemna skladišta povezana s transportnom mrežom mogu u samo nekoliko sati pustiti vrlo velike količine plina u sustav kada temperature padnu, zakaže neki uvozni pravac, kasni LNG teret ili naglo poraste potražnja. Njihova funkcija stoga nije samo čuvati dovoljno energije za cijelu zimu. Ona pružaju nešto jednako važno: isporučivost – sposobnost da se velike količine plina uvedu u mrežu upravo onda kada su potrebne.

3.Njemačka u problemu?

Njemačka trenutačno posebno jasno pokazuje problem. Do 25. kolovoza njemačka skladišta bila su popunjena približno 51%, što je najniži udio za ovo doba godine u najmanje 15 godina. Udruženje njemačkih operatora transportnog sustava, FNB Gas, procjenjuje da je efektivni zakonski cilj za 1. studenoga na razini cijelog njemačkog sustava skladišta sada teško još ostvariv. (Ipak, njemačko Ministarstvo gospodarstva navelo je da bi popunjenost skladišta od 60-70% na početku zime bila dovoljna za podmirivanje prosječne zimske potražnje.) Jednako je važan i institucionalni problem u Njemačkoj. Njemački zakon propisuje minimalne razine popunjenosti skladišta i postupak prema kojem će ih, u konačnici, popuniti upravitelj tržišnog područja Trading Hub Europe (THE), ali svakom dobavljaču ili trgovcu ne nalaže: “Morate držati X količinu plina za kupce koje opskrbljujete.” Njemačka stoga izravnije regulira željeni rezultat nego što raspodjeljuje odgovornost za njegovo ostvarenje.

4.A što je u drugim europskim zemljama?

Druge europske zemlje odabrale su drukčije modele. Francuska je krajem kolovoza imala popunjeno oko dvije trećine svojih skladišta. Ondje se nositeljima skladišnih kapaciteta nameću izravnije obveze. Dobavljači koji su rezervirali skladišni kapacitet moraju do 1. studenoga imati popunjeno najmanje 85% tog kapaciteta. Krajem kolovoza talijanska skladišta bila su već oko 80% puna, dovoljno da podupru cilj popunjenosti od 90%. Italija se u velikoj mjeri oslanja na aukcije i regulatorne intervencije.

5.Pozicija Hrvatske?

Hrvatska je za predstojeću zimu zauzela još izravniji pristup. Podzemno skladište Okoli bilo je krajem kolovoza popunjeno gotovo 69% i do 1. listopada mora biti popunjeno najmanje 85% (pojednostavljeno). Drugim riječima, Hrvatska nije samo odredila željenu razinu popunjenosti; identificirala je subjekte koji moraju pomoći osigurati plin i uspostavila mehanizam za pokrivanje opravdanih troškova.

Ove razlike razotkrivaju strukturnu slabost europske politike skladištenja: Europa je uspješnije uskladila cilj nego odgovornost. Najvažnije operativno pitanje često ostaje bez odgovora: tko zapravo mora kupiti plin?

Sve bi to bilo manje važno kada bi tržišni poticaji snažno išli u prilog punjenju skladišta. Trenutačno nije tako.

6.O logici trgovanja

Teoretska logika trgovanja uz korištenje skladišta jednostavna je. Tvrtka ljeti kupuje plin kada su potražnja i cijene razmjerno niske, plaća troškove skladištenja i financiranja, a zatim plin zimi prodaje ili koristi kada su cijene više. Razlika između ljetnih i zimskih cijena – ljetno-zimski raspon – pokriva uslugu skladištenja, angažirani kapital i komercijalni rizik. Danas se, međutim, ta logika djelomično preokrenula. Terminska krivulja je u backwardaciji: plin za bližu isporuku može biti skuplji od plina za isporuku kasnije tijekom godine. Dana 25. kolovoza cijena plina za isporuku sljedećeg dana na nizozemskom čvorištu TTF iznosila je oko 68,2 €/MWh, dok se sezonski ugovor za zimu 2026./27. trgovao po približno 66,9 €/MWh. Sličan obrazac mogao se vidjeti i na drugim europskim čvorištima.

7.Cijene plina

Postoji još jedna važna dimenzija: cijene plina porasle su za oko 30% posljednjih tjedana. Europa stoga pokušava puniti neuobičajeno prazna skladišta upravo u trenutku kada je plin potreban za utiskivanje postao znatno skuplji. Time se dilema dodatno zaoštrava: zalihe plina postaju sve važnije za sigurnost opskrbe, dok je njihovo stvaranje istodobno sve skuplje i komercijalno sve manje privlačno.

Tu leži centralni paradoks: Društvo ima korist od toga što je plin dostupan tijekom ekstremnog zahlađenja, poremećaja u opskrbi LNG-om ili infrastrukturnog kvara, ali pojedina tvrtka nema mnogo razloga prihvatiti predvidiv gubitak samo zato što njezine zalihe povećavaju otpornost europskog energetskog sustava. Ako netko ne plati za tu vrijednost sigurnosti – ili ne uvede jasnu obvezu njezina osiguranja – pojedinačno racionalne odluke mogu dovesti do kolektivno nesigurnog ishoda.

8.Potrošači će platiti račun i izvući „deblji kraj“?

Na kraju će posljedice osjetiti i potrošači. Manjak plina u skladištima obično se najprije ne pojavljuje kao fizički prekid opskrbe kućanstava plinom. Najprije se očituje u veleprodajnim cijenama i premijama za rizik. Učinak na maloprodajne ugovore dolazi s odgodom. Drugim riječima: ako ove zime plina bude nedostajalo, treba očekivati rast cijena na plinskim čvorištima – a poslije i za kućanstva i industriju.

9.Zabrinutost i sigurnost opskrbe plinom u Europi

Umirujući odgovor na zabrinutost za sigurnost opskrbe plinom u Europi često glasi: “Sada imamo više LNG-a.” Točno, ali to je samo pola odgovora. LNG je diversificirao izvore opskrbe, smanjio ovisnost o pojedinačnim plinovodnim pravcima i omogućio zamjenu velikog dijela nekadašnjeg ruskog plinovodnog uvoza. Ali LNG terminal nije podzemno skladište, a kapacitet regasifikacije nije isto što i zajamčena isporučivost kroz cijelu europsku mrežu. LNG najprije mora biti dostupan na svjetskom tržištu. Teret se mora kupiti, ukrcati, prevesti, iskrcati i regasificirati. Plin se zatim mora transportirati plinovodnom mrežom ograničenog kapaciteta. Alternativnim isporukama LNG-a od udaljenih izvoznika mogu biti potrebni tjedni da stignu u Europu. Plin iz skladišta, nasuprot tome, već se fizički nalazi unutar europskog sustava. Zato Europi trebaju LNG i skladišta – a ne LNG umjesto skladišta.

10.Politički zaključak

Politički zaključak stoga je zahtjevniji od pukog poziva tržišnim sudionicima da “brže pune”. Europa – Europska komisija, nacionalne vlade, regulatori i sudionici na tržištu – konačno mora odlučiti tko je odgovoran za osiguranje za zimu, tko ga plaća te je li sigurnost opskrbe prvenstveno kolektivna obveza ili individualna komercijalna odgovornost. Problem nije u manjku mogućih instrumenata. Problem je u odabiru koherentne raspodjele odgovornosti.

Čak i ako prirodnog plina u Europi ima i bit će ga, sigurnosna margina se suzila, a tržišni signali su neintuitivni. Zima će pokazati je li Europa kupila dovoljno osiguranja. No tada bi premija mogla biti znatno viša.

Dr. Andrej Pustišek
Hochschule für Technik Stuttgart,
2Pi-Energy Austria GmbH
Germany Austria

The paradox of European gas storage: security demands more gas, the market does not

1. Gas is expensive?

Gas is expensive, storage is lagging behind, and LNG is no substitute for storage. That is an awkward starting position for Europe heading into winter. On 23 August, EU natural gas storage was only around 62% full. In 2025, it was 76%, compared to a historical average of 80%. The EU still has a target of filling underground storage to 90%. However, under the rules in force from 2025 to 2027, member states now have a two-month deadline – from 1 October to 1 December – to reach that target. They can deviate from the target in the event of difficult market conditions or technical constraints.

2. Gas storage – gas system shock absorber

Storage can be seen as a shock absorber for the gas system. Underground storage facilities connected to the transmission network can release very large quantities of gas into the system in just a few hours when temperatures drop, an import route fails, an LNG cargo is delayed or demand increases sharply. Their function is therefore not only to store enough energy for the whole winter. They provide something equally important: deliverability – the ability to introduce large quantities of gas into the network exactly when they are needed.

3. Germany in trouble?

Germany is currently showing the problem particularly clearly. By August 25, German storage facilities were about 51% full, the lowest level for this time of year in at least 15 years. The association of German transmission system operators, FNB Gas, estimates that the effective legal target for November 1 for the entire German storage system is now difficult to achieve. (However, the German Ministry of Economy has stated that a storage capacity of 60-70% at the beginning of winter would be sufficient to meet average winter demand.) Equally important is the institutional problem in Germany. German law prescribes minimum storage capacity levels and the procedure by which they are ultimately filled by the market area manager, Trading Hub Europe (THE), but it does not tell each supplier or trader: “You must hold X amount of gas for the customers you supply.” Germany therefore regulates the desired result more directly than it distributes responsibility for achieving it.

4.What about other European countries?

Other European countries have chosen different models. France had about two-thirds of its warehouses full at the end of August. There, more direct obligations are imposed on storage capacity holders. Suppliers who have reserved storage capacity must have at least 85% of that capacity filled by November 1. By the end of August, Italian warehouses were already about 80% full, enough to support the 90% occupancy target. Italy relies heavily on auctions and regulatory interventions.

5. Position of Croatia?

Croatia has taken an even more direct approach for the upcoming winter. The Okoli underground storage facility was almost 69% full by the end of August and must be at least 85% full by October 1 (simplified). In other words, Croatia has not only set a desired level of fullness; it has identified entities that must help secure gas and established a mechanism to cover eligible costs.

These differences expose a structural weakness of European storage policy: Europe has been more successful in aligning the goal than the responsibility. The most important operational question often remains unanswered: who actually has to buy the gas?

All of this would be less important if market incentives were strongly in favor of filling storage. That is not the case at the moment.

6.About trading logic

The theoretical logic of trading using storage is simple. A company buys gas in the summer when demand and prices are relatively low, pays storage and financing costs, and then sells or uses the gas in the winter when prices are higher. The difference between summer and winter prices – the summer-winter spread – covers the storage service, the capital employed and the commercial risk. Today, however, this logic has partially reversed. The forward curve is backward-looking: gas for closer delivery can be more expensive than gas for delivery later in the year. On 25 August, the price of gas for next-day delivery at the Dutch TTF hub was around €68.2/MWh, while the seasonal contract for winter 2026/27 was trading at around €66.9/MWh. A similar pattern could be seen at other European hubs.

7. Gas prices

There is another important dimension: gas prices have risen by around 30% in recent weeks. Europe is therefore trying to fill unusually empty storage facilities at the very moment when the gas needed for injection has become significantly more expensive. This further exacerbates the dilemma: gas reserves are becoming increasingly important for security of supply, while their creation is simultaneously becoming increasingly expensive and commercially less attractive.

Therein lies the central paradox: Society benefits from having gas available during extreme cold snaps, LNG supply disruptions, or infrastructure failures, but an individual company has little reason to accept a foreseeable loss simply because its stocks increase the resilience of Europe’s energy system. If one does not pay for that security value – or impose a clear obligation to ensure it – individually rational decisions can lead to collectively unsafe outcomes.

8. Will consumers pay the bill and get the “bigger end”?

Ultimately, consumers will also feel the consequences. Gas shortages in storage facilities usually do not initially manifest themselves as a physical disruption to household gas supplies. They are first reflected in wholesale prices and risk premiums. The impact on retail contracts is delayed. In other words: if there is a gas shortage this winter, we should expect prices to rise at gas hubs – and then for households and industry.

9. Concerns and security of gas supply in Europe

The reassuring answer to concerns about the security of gas supply in Europe is often: “We have more LNG now.” True, but that is only half the answer. LNG has diversified supply sources, reduced dependence on individual pipeline routes, and allowed the replacement of much of what was once Russian pipeline imports. But an LNG terminal is not underground storage, and regasification capacity is not the same as guaranteed delivery across the entire European network. LNG must first be available on the world market. The cargo must be purchased, loaded, transshipped, unloaded, and regasified. The gas must then be transported through a limited-capacity pipeline network. Alternative LNG supplies from distant exporters can take weeks to reach Europe. Gas from storage, by contrast, is already physically located within the European system. That is why Europe needs LNG and storage – not LNG instead of storage.

10. Political conclusion

The political conclusion is therefore more demanding than simply calling on market participants to “fill up faster”. Europe – the European Commission, national governments, regulators and market participants – must finally decide who is responsible for winter insurance , who pays for it and whether security of supply is primarily a collective obligation or an individual commercial responsibility . The problem is not a lack of possible instruments. The problem is choosing a coherent distribution of responsibilities.

Even if there is and will be natural gas in Europe, the safety margin has narrowed and the market signals are counterintuitive. Winter will show whether Europe has bought enough insurance. But then the premium could be significantly higher.