Gordana Gelenčer, novinarka

1.Energija kao glavno oružje geopolitike i geoekonomije

Rast (ekonomski, tehnološki, informacijski) treba obilje energije. A energija je od 2022. glavno oružje geopolitičkoga rata koji kida stari poredak i rađa novi. Tko drži energetske izvore u (ne)dostižnoj je prednosti kod zauzimanja novih startnih pozicija. Jer, tržištima danas upravljaju ratovi – ako se energija uvozi!

Ako lokalna elektrana radi na uvozno fosilno gorivo, cijena se električne energije faktički kroji u inozemstvu. Hrvatska svoj položaj crpi iz položaja Europske unije. A njena je pozicija (trenutno) prilično jadna. EU uvozi 97 posto nafte, 90 posto plina, 40 posto ugljena i 100 posto urana (okaj, ovo potonje očito ne treba, jer nuklearke gasi).

Hrvatska uvozi 80 posto nafte, 67 posto plina, 100 posto ugljena, pa uvoz ‘proizvodi’ između 25 i 30 posto ukupne energije, unatoč visokome udjelu hidroelektrana i obnovljivih izvora.

2. Kako stojimo s obnovljivim izvorima?

Tu smo mrvu bolji od prosjeka EU. Ukupni udjel OIE u EU iznosi oko 24 posto bruto konačne potrošnje energije. Doduše, Direktivom je postavljen obvezujući cilj od najmanje 42,5 posto do 2030., što bi značilo da u četiri godine udjel treba gotovo udvostručiti. Koliko je to moguća misija, i Grunf bi znao procijeniti. Hrvatska je, s druge strane, uspjela nagurati do otprilike 30 posto. Prema ažuriranome Integriranom energetskom i klimatskom planu (NECP), cilj je do 2030. dosegnuti 36,4 posto – što je ipak više izvedivo nego za EU. Ostali podaci vele kako OIE pokrivaju više od 50 posto domaće proizvodnje struje, prije svega zbog visokoga udjela hidroenergije, ali i brzoga rasta novih sunčanih i vjetroelektrana (za što sigurno nije zaslužna HERA čiji se cjenik naknada za priključenje čekao tri godine zbog čega je (iz)visilo oko milijardu i pol eura ulaganja).

3.Suvisla energetska strategija

U situaciji kada energetski problem u energiji siromašnim zemljama (kakva je i Hrvatska) detonira jače od termobarične bombe jasno je da nam treba suvisla energetska strategija. Hrvatska je ima. No, pisana je 2020. (s ciljanim dometom do 2030. i proširenim do 2050.), a svijet se već s pandemijskim zaključavanjem okrenuo naglavce, pa bi suvisla vlast već 2022. pisala novu, održivu strategiju.

NECP je ne može zamijeniti (jer energija nije isključivo pitanje klime). Baš kao što je ne mogu zamijeniti ni državne energetske subvencije, koje sada kotiraju kao neki oblik krizne strategije. Subvencije neće (iz)držati još dugo, jer su javne financije već prenapregnute.

U kuloarima se šuška i o proceduri prekomjernoga deficita koja čeka iz ugla, pa kod krojenja proračuna za iduću godinu treba stiskati sve troškove. Za pametnu bi vlast to bila uporišna točka konačne promjene neodrživoga energetskog modela.

Uz to što nema održivo dugoročno energetsko rješenje, Hrvatska je i jedna od rijetkih zemalja koja nisku cijenu struje drži za građane (čime, jasno, kupuje socijalni mir i glasove) dok gospodarstvo, koje stvara BDP i životni standard, plaća drugu najvišu cijenu struje u euro zoni (cijena je mjerena za IE kategoriju, dakle, za energetski intenzivne kupce/velike industrijske potrošače).

Cijena je za gospodarstvo oko 20 posto viša nego za kućanstva, što je suprotno praksama u većini EU zemalja i dodatno opterećuje industrijski sektor.

4.Cijena električne energije

Kada se cijena električne energije promatra u standardu kupovne moći, hrvatska poduzeća u razredu godišnje potrošnje od dvije tisuće do 19.999 megavatsati imaju oko 18 posto veće troškovno opterećenje od prosjeka Unije.

Električna je energija jedan od ključnih troškova, a u Hrvatskoj industriji čini 25,8 posto finalne potrošnje energije. Kako računaju u HUP-u, u sektorima u kojima električna energija čini između 15 i 40 posto varijabilnoga troška, razlika od samo 10 do 15 eura po produktivnost i dugoročnu industrijsku bazu. To ne znači da cijene građanima trebaju divljati, no subvencije tada trebaju imati konkretno ime i prezime, izravno iz proračuna. U suvremeno doba informacijske sveprisutnosti to doista ne bi trebao biti problem. Megavat satu izravno smanjuje profitabilnost i odgađa ulaganja, jer utječe i na investicijski kapacitet.

5.O stanju infrastrukture kao takve

Ono što je itekako stvarni problem, posebno zbog rasta OIE, jest stanje infrastrukre. Najveći je dio prijenosnog sustava (220 kV) izgrađen još početkom 1960-ih godina, dok je glavno pojačanje sustava na najvišu razinu od 400 kV dovršeno krajem 1970-ih godina. To znači da je više od 3500 kilometara dalekovoda starije od 40 godina, dakle, kritične je starosti. Unutar najraširenije mreže od 110 kV, čak 2867 kilometara vodova starije je od četiri desetljeća, dok u mreži od 220 kV ta brojka iznosi blizu 1170 kilometara. To nisu napamet izvučene brojke, to su podaci HOPS-a!

Treba li uopće napominjati da su ti stari dalekovodi podložniji kvarovima, posebno pri sve češćim ekstremnim vremenskim uvjetima, i da zahtijevaju stalnu – i vrlo skupu! – revitalizaciju. Usko je grlo hrvatske elektroenergetske mreže na potezu Lika – Gorski kotar – primorje (poveznica Dalmacije i ostatka kontinentalne Hrvatske). Zašto? Pa zato što je Dalmacija postala golem bazen proizvodnje OIE i sva ta struja želi teći prema sjeveru Hrvatske i Srednjoj Europi gdje su kupvi i gdje je potrošnja najveća. Postojeći dalekovodi fizički ne mogu propustiti toliku količinu energije kroz uski geografski koridor Like i Gorskoga kotara.

6.O zarobljenim projektima na jugu

Stoga su na jugu zarobljeni projekti obnovljivih izvora teški više od 3,5 GW spremnih zelenih projekata (solari i vjetroelektrane) u strahu da bi mogli srušiti sustav. Dodajmo tomu i da se lokalna uska grla redovito javljaju u Istri i na otocima sjevernoga Jadrana (Krk, Cres, Lošinj, Rab) tijekom ljetne turističke sezone, kada potrošnja zbog turizma drastično skače. Zbog dotrajalosti otočnih kabela, HOPS izvan sezone provodi hitne rekonstrukcije kako bi izbjegao havarije ljeti, što također prilično košta. Prema HOPS-ovu desetgodišnjem planu ulaganja (2026. – 2035.) čekaju nas povijesna kapitalna ulaganja od čak 2,7 milijardi eura. Zvuči sjajno, no treba znati kako su najveći radovi predviđeni tek iza 2030. , s planiranim trajanjem do 2040., vjerojatno i dulje. Jer, poznavajući stanje zemljišnih knjiga i vrijeme potrebno za najobičniju građevinsku dozvolu, bit ćemo sretni ako se prva lopata zabode 2035.

7. OIEH i HOPS. Razgovori ugodni naroda energetičarskog

Planovi su bez sumnje ambiciozni i više nego potrebni (i to jučer, ne 2035.), no HOPS se već sada suočava s golemim otporom investitora. Naime, HOPS je kroz nova pravila i odluke pokušao prebaciti velik dio troškova dugoročne modernizacije sustava na leđa investitora u solarne i vjetroelektrane (kroz iznimno visoke naknade za priključenje). Udruženje Obnovljivi izvori energije Hrvatske (OIEH) upozorava da bi zbog toga investitori mogli odustati od projekata ukupne snage veće od 2,5 GW, a dio je tvrtki već pokrenuo tužbe protiv HOPS-a i HERA-e. Sve su to teški domaći problemi koje je strategija odavna trebala adresirati. A nije.

8.U očekivanju Godota ili Sad će Bože svaki čas!

Čekajući Godota (visinu naknade za priključak) mnogi su investitori već napustili Hrvatsku (recimo, zvučno najatraktivniji i financijski najmoćniji, norveški Statkraft i francuski Neoen), i krenuli u znatno prosperitetniju Slovačku i Rumunjsku koje ne cjepidlače s administracijom i ne tjeraju visokim troškovima i pravnom nesigurnošću.

To nikako ne znači da OIE treba zaobilaziti kao okužene, naprotiv, ako je geopolitička ovisnost strateška ranjivost, a jest, Hrvatska nema drugoga puta osim onoga koji krči (za početak, krnju) samodostatnost kroz bildanje OIE. Uz baterijske sustave i napredne mikro mreže (sjajno ih razvija domaći Končar) moguće je i dugoročno planiranje, HOPS-u i HERA-i unatoč.

A praksa veli kako se ono svodi na minimizaciju, i udaljenosti od kuće do posla i lanaca opskrbe – uz dobre interkonkcije, kakve Hrvatska ima s BiH, Mađarskom i Slovenijom, neizravno i s Italijom preko Crne Gore).

Državu, dakle, ništa ne sprječava u izradi nove strategije niti postoje prepreke za ulaganje (barem) u energetsku efikasnost. Osim one ključne – država u kojoj dio institucija ide šumom, drugi drumom, stvara minimum šanse za to da se u nekoj, bilo kojoj, budućnosti susretnu u ishodišnoj točki, neophodnoj za izgradnju održivih rješenja.

Gordana Gelenčer, journalist

ENERGY AND ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

1. Energy as the main weapon of geopolitics and geoeconomics

Growth (economic, technological, informational) needs an abundance of energy. And since 2022, energy is the main weapon of the geopolitical war that is tearing up the old order and giving birth to a new one. Whoever holds the energy sources has an (un)attainable advantage when taking new starting positions. Because today markets are governed by wars – if energy is imported!

If a local power plant runs on imported fossil fuel, the price of electricity is effectively set abroad. Croatia draws its position from that of the European Union. And its position is (currently) quite poor. The EU imports 97 percent of its oil, 90 percent of its gas, 40 percent of its coal and 100 percent of its uranium (okay, the latter is obviously not needed, because it is shutting down nuclear power plants).

Croatia imports 80 percent of its oil, 67 percent of its gas, and 100 percent of its coal, so imports ‘produce’ between 25 and 30 percent of its total energy, despite the high share of hydroelectric power plants and renewable sources.

2. How are we doing with renewable sources?

We are slightly better than the EU average here. The total share of RES in the EU amounts to around 24 percent of gross final energy consumption. However, the Directive sets a binding target of at least 42.5 percent by 2030, which would mean that the share should almost double in four years. Even Grunf would know how feasible that is. Croatia, on the other hand, has managed to squeeze it up to around 30 percent. According to the updated Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), the goal is to reach 36.4 percent by 2030 – which is still more feasible than for the EU. Other data shows that RES cover more than 50 percent of domestic electricity production, primarily due to the high share of hydropower, but also the rapid growth of new solar and wind power plants (which is certainly not due to HERA, whose price list for connection fees was delayed for three years, which resulted in an investment of around one and a half billion euros).

3. A coherent energy strategy

In a situation where the energy problem in energy-poor countries (such as Croatia) detonates stronger than a thermobaric bomb, it is clear that we need a coherent energy strategy. Croatia has it. However, it was written in 2020 (with a target reach of 2030 and extended to 2050), and the world has already turned upside down with the pandemic lockdown, so a coherent government would already be writing a new, sustainable strategy in 2022.

The NECP cannot replace it (because energy is not exclusively a climate issue). Just as state energy subsidies, which are now being quoted as some form of crisis strategy, cannot replace it. Subsidies will not last much longer, because public finances are already overstretched.

In the backroom, there are also rumors about the excessive deficit procedure that is waiting around the corner, so when tailoring the budget for next year, all costs should be squeezed. For a smart government, it would be the fulcrum of the final change of the unsustainable energy model.

In addition to not having a sustainable long-term energy solution, Croatia is also one of the few countries that keeps the price of electricity low for its citizens (which, of course , buys social peace and votes) while the economy, which creates GDP and living standards, pays the second highest price for electricity in the euro zone (the price is measured for the IE category, therefore, for energy-intensive customers/large industrial consumers).

The price for the economy is about 20 percent higher than for households, which is contrary to practices in most EU countries and places an additional burden on the industrial sector.

4. Price of electricity

When the price of electricity is viewed in purchasing power parity terms, Croatian companies in the annual consumption class of two thousand to 19,999 megawatt hours have an approximately 18 percent higher cost burden than the EU average.

Electricity is one of the key costs, and in Croatian industry it accounts for 25.8 percent of final energy consumption. According to the calculations of the Croatian Employers’ Association, in sectors where electricity accounts for between 15 and 40 percent of variable costs, the difference of only 10 to 15 euros in productivity and long-term industrial base. This does not mean that prices for citizens should be wild, but subsidies should then have a specific name and surname, directly from the budget. In the modern era of information ubiquity, this really should not be a problem. Megawatt hour directly reduces profitability and postpones investments, because it also affects investment capacity.

5.About the state of the infrastructure as such

What is a very real problem, especially due to the growth of RES, is the state of the infrastructure. The largest part of the transmission system (220 kV) was built in the early 1960s, while the main reinforcement of the system to the highest level of 400 kV was completed in the late 1970s. This means that more than 3,500 kilometers of transmission lines are older than 40 years, i.e., of critical age. Within the most widespread 110 kV network, as many as 2,867 kilometers of lines are older than four decades, while in the 220 kV network, this figure is close to 1,170 kilometers. These are not numbers drawn from memory, these are data from HOPS!

Needless to say, these old power lines are more susceptible to breakdowns, especially in increasingly frequent extreme weather conditions, and require constant – and very expensive! – revitalization. The bottleneck of the Croatian electricity network is on the Lika – Gorski kotar – coast line (connecting Dalmatia and the rest of continental Croatia). Why? Well, because Dalmatia has become a huge pool of RES production and all that electricity wants to flow towards the north of Croatia and Central Europe, where the purchases and consumption are the highest. The existing power lines cannot physically pass such an amount of energy through the narrow geographical corridor of Lika and Gorski kotar.

6. About the trapped projects in the south

Therefore, renewable energy projects weighing more than 3.5 GW of ready-made green projects (solar and wind power plants) are trapped in the south for fear that they could bring down the system. Let’s add to this that local bottlenecks regularly occur in Istria and on the islands of the northern Adriatic (Krk, Cres, Lošinj, Rab) during the summer tourist season, when consumption due to tourism jumps drastically. Due to the deterioration of the island’s cables, HOPS carries out emergency reconstructions in the off-season to avoid breakdowns in the summer, which is also quite expensive. According to HOPS’s ten-year investment plan (2026-2035), we are waiting for historic capital investments of as much as 2.7 billion euros. It sounds great, but you should know that the largest works are planned only after 2030, with a planned duration until 2040, probably even longer. Because, knowing the state of the land registers and the time needed for the most ordinary building permit, we will be lucky if the first shovel is dug in 2035.

7. OIEH and HOPS. Pleasant conversations of people from the energy industry

The plans are undoubtedly ambitious and more than necessary (and yesterday, not 2035), but HOPS is already facing huge resistance from investors. Namely, through new rules and decisions, HOPS has tried to shift a large part of the costs of long-term modernization of the system onto investors in solar and wind power plants (through extremely high connection fees). The Association of Renewable Energy Sources of Croatia (OIEH) warns that this could cause investors to abandon projects with a total capacity of more than 2.5 GW, and some companies have already filed lawsuits against HOPS and HERA. These are all serious domestic problems that the strategy should have addressed long ago. And it didn’t.

8. Waiting for Godot or God willing, any moment now!

While waiting for Godot (the amount of the connection fee), many investors have already left Croatia (say, the most sonically attractive and financially powerful, the Norwegian Statkraft and the French Neoen), and headed for the much more prosperous Slovakia and Romania, which do not bother with the administration and are not forced by high costs and legal uncertainty.

This does not mean that RES should be bypassed as infected, on the contrary, if geopolitical dependence is a strategic vulnerability, and it is, Croatia has no other path than the one that clears (for starters, truncates) self-sufficiency through the building of RES. With battery systems and advanced microgrids (they are brilliantly developed by the domestic Končar), long-term planning is also possible, despite HOPS and HERA.

And practice shows that it comes down to minimizing both the distance from home to work and supply chains – with good interconnections, such as Croatia has with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Slovenia, and indirectly with Italy via Montenegro).

Therefore, nothing prevents the state from creating a new strategy, nor are there any obstacles to investing (at least) in energy efficiency. Apart from the crucial one – a state where part of the institutions go through the forest, others by road, creates a minimum chance for them to meet at the starting point, necessary for the construction of sustainable solutions, in some, any, future.